Case Study: Determine the best security equipment for entry control screening for use in Iraq and Afghanistan

This independent analysis was conducted by Doug Melvin. In 2004 through 2005, Mr. Melvin was the Iraq Country Director for Department of Homeland Security in Baghdad[1]. Prior to that assignment he was the Director of Security and Administrative Services within the Executive Office of the President. Currently, as an independent security consultant, Mr. Melvin is often approached by companies and governments with developing cost-effective security solutions. With over 25 years of professional security expertise, including extensive experience operating in Iraq and Afghanistan on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense and State Department, combined with on-going research and development efforts, Mr. Melvin is an expert on domestic and international security matters. Additionally, Mr. Melvin has 12 years of military experience in U.S. Army Special Forces and Military Police. This document was prepared for military and security personnel operating in Iraq or Afghanistan and express only the opinions of Doug Melvin.
[1] As a member of AMB Negroponte’s senior staff, Mr. Melvin had primary responsibility for determining and implementing security measures at all ports of entry and border areas.

Findings

For or use in Iraq or Afghanistan, the AS&E SIM is superior to other equipment for personnel entry control screening. The AS&E SIM provides superior detection capabilities and significantly higher throughput than other equipment. The AS&E SIM is also more cost effective than equipment offered by competitors.

Evaluation Areas

Throughput – The throughput of entry control screening equipment is presented in terms of the number of personnel that can be effectively screened in one hour to standard. The AS&E SIM has a throughput that is over twice the rate of current market-standard equipment. For example, the AS&E SIM has a rate of 250/hour, while the other leading device has a throughput rate of only 120/hour. It should also be noted that the other leading device does not provide the same level of comprehensive scan (backscatter screening) that the AS&E SIM provides. Throughput is important because it minimizes the time to screen personnel and helps to eliminate the formation of long lines of personnel that are attractive targets for the enemy.

Operability –The ability to operate in hostile and harsh environmental conditions is critical to minimizing downtime and maximizing force protection. The AS&E SIM provides its own climate-controlled environment to ensure continued operation and versatility. Other products depend upon the climate-control capabilities of the building in which they are housed. In Iraq and Afghanistan, building climate-control is generally unreliable. Moving the screening function inside a building, dependant on the HVAC systems, places additional personnel and facilities at risk. Screening is best conducted outside of the perimeter, where observation and control can be maximized, and the risk and exposure to security staff can be minimized. See more on this subject in the force protection analysis below.

Detection capability – The ability to detect and differentiate organic and non-organic elements (backscatter technology) is critical to ensuring that a comprehensive scan can be completed. The AS&E SIM is the only equipment to have such technology. Additionally, other leading equipment requires that the subject stand in a specific spot while being scanned each and every time. This stance enables a trained terrorist the opportunity to learn from the screening process and take preventive measures to defeat the security scan. With the AS&E SIM, the subject does not remain in the same position each time, thus eliminating any opportunity to learn from the screening process and defeat the system. Additionally, the AS&E SIM does not depend upon the installation of additional optional equipment such as a “back panel” to achieve an improved image capability.

Accountability – The need to depend upon host-nation personnel or third country nationals for security operations can present risk. The challenges include risk of insider threat, errors as a result of training issues, or language barriers that prevent adequate operational ability. The AS&E SIM effectively addresses this issue. By providing a remote monitoring (image viewing and CCTV coverage) capability of the screening operations, including the ability to remotely stop and secure the screening area, the operations can be monitored by US military or security personnel at a remote location.


Force Protection – In terms of force protection, the AS&E SIM provides the capability to strategically place the screening operation where it is best from a containment, standoff, and force protection perspective. Because the AS&E SIM comes with its own climate- control and infrastructure, it is not dependant upon finding a building with adequate infrastructure. It can be placed where it makes most sense, and where all possible military and strategic advantages can be attained. For example the sides of the AS&E SIM can be sandbagged, or it can be placed in a depression to limit collateral damage in the event of an internal detonation. Basic military doctrine applies in the case of entry control screening, meaning that it can be viewed as would any other battlefield obstacle. It should be placed where observation is afforded and it can be mutually supported, while minimizing the risk to personnel and facilities.

Cost - Cost should be measured in terms of the cost per person to be screened, not simply in terms of a direct comparison cost per piece of equipment. For example; the AS&E SIM is approximately 25% more expensive than the leading competitor. However, the cost of screening is far less for the AS&E SIM due to its significantly higher throughput. In fact, achieving the same level of throughput of one AS&E SIM would require two of the competing units. This advantage is further magnified by the enhanced detection capability, force protection measures, deployment advantages, accountability, and operability factors, of the AS&E SIM.

[1] As a member of AMB Negroponte’s senior staff, Mr. Melvin had primary responsibility for determining and implementing security measures at all ports of entry and border areas.

The Iraq Question by Doug Melvin, Homeland Security

In early 2004, Doug Melvin volunteered to serve as the first Country Director for Department of Homeland Security in Iraq. As Security Director for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Doug’s experience and work in Iraq from May 2004 – July 2005, was some of the most difficult, treacherous, and gratifying work that he’d ever done on international migration and counter-insurgency work.

During this assignment Doug faced a number of exciting challenges, which he talks about in this blog.

I was in Iraq from May 31, 2004 through June 2005. I worked 7 days a week, at least 18 hours each day. I traveled extensively, and at great risk throughout Iraq, both by air and by land. Over the course of the year I had a number of very close calls where a few seconds may the difference between life and death. I and my colleagues were subjected to constant mortar attacks, some of which killed friends, the constant concern and fear of being kidnapped or killed, and had to endure some of the worst environmental conditions in the world. It was a long year. My tour was scheduled for one year.

Department of Homeland Security in Iraq On the Job Accomplishments Include:

• Developed and implemented a highly successful border security plan for the Iraqi government and coalition forces. The "Border Support Team” (BST) concept was enthusiastically approved and implemented by the Minister of Interior and coalition forces and was credited with dramatically improving security along the Iraqi/Syrian border;
• Developed and implemented the technical (IT and document inspection) country wide for the Iraqi government;
• Directly responsible for developing the Iraq national standard and strategy for training Iraqi Border security forces, immigration, and customs personnel. Implemented a highly effective training program in Amman Jordan that produced 80 Iraqi border security instructors and over 2000 Iraqi border security forces. Responsible for establishing future capacity for training and developing migration, customs, and border security personnel.

The Iraq Question by Doug Melvin, Homeland Security

Doug Melvin first volunteered to serve as the first Country Director for Department of Homeland Security in Iraq in March 2004. As Security Director for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Doug’s experiences in Iraq were some of the most complex, hazardous, and gratifying work that he’d done on international migration and counter-insurgency work.

In this blog, Doug talks about his credentials and background, which led to obtaining this important position.

I was selected for this position from over 5,000 volunteers and candidates form within the 22 agencies in the Department of Homeland Security.

I believe that I was selected as a result of my Special Forces background, highly successful prior experience working in conflict zones and under combat conditions, and for my expertise in DHS functions, including customs, immigration, and border security. Additionally, I had over 20 years of international experience world wide and significant security experience in the Middle East.

The Iraq Question by Doug Melvin, Homeland Security

Doug Melvin volunteered to serve as the first Country Director for Department of Homeland Security in Iraq in March 2004. As Security Director for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Doug’s experiences in Iraq from May 2004 to July 2005 were some of the most difficult, dangerous, and rewarding jobs that he’d done on international migration and counter-insurgency work.

During his assignment, Doug found himself working with a number of talented and dedicated government officials, which he talks about in this blog.

While serving as the Country Director for Iraq, on behalf of Secretary Ridge and his successor Secretary Chertoff, I had the opportunity to work very closely with General Petraeus, Ambassador Negroponte, and Ambassador Jefferies on the transformation of the Iraqi customs, immigration, and border security forces. A great deal of credit should go to them for supporting and making possible some significant accomplishments with enhancing the Department of Border Enforcement.

Without their efforts and support, and that of Secretary Ridge and Chertoff, there would have been far more death and destruction subjected to collation forces and the Iraqi people. Clearly the start of the transformation, as the process is still underway, has saved countless lives.

The Iraq Question by Doug Melvin, Homeland Security

In March 2004, Doug Melvin volunteered to serve as the first Country Director for Department of Homeland Security in Iraq. As Security Director for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Doug’s experience and work in Iraq during the year May 2004 – July 2005, was some of the most difficult, dangerous, and rewarding work that he’d ever done on international migration and counter-insurgency work.

In preparation for this assignment Doug found it was necessary to conduct a comprehensive assessment and evaluation of the current status of Iraqi customs, immigration, and border security forces, which he talks about in this blog. This effort was accomplished in partnership with collation military, representative collation governments, adjacent countries, and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

The Iraqi customs, immigration and border security forces assessment found four significant findings:

1. The years of sanctions and lack of attention by the former Iraqi government created a situation whereby the necessary infrastructure and basic technology to secure a border and operate ports of entry no longer existed. The lack of proper infrastructure at the ports of entry had far reaching negative impacts on the revenue generated from cross border commerce. Notwithstanding the security vulnerabilities caused by the lack of infrastructure, at one port of entry, I estimated the loss in one day from ineffective and improper customs operations was over $ 300,000 USD in one 24-hour period. This combined with the ongoing corruption meant the Iraqi government and people were losing value revenue. The lack of infrastructure and basic technology greatly contributed to the next significant issue. Personnel!
2. With the lack of infrastructure and technology, this meant that the entire border security process, customs, border security, and immigration were entirely dependant personnel to perform all tasks and thereby inefficiently labor intensive. The pre-war Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) was one that relied upon conscripts, paramilitary forces, and civil servants. Each department with the DBE, customs, immigration, and border security operated independently and without regard to the other departments. All departments were plagued with a constant and high number of desertions, poorly trained personnel, and poor morale stemming from lack of proper equipment, food, water, and pay.
3. The other significant issue was the lack of any policies, procedures, or accountability. Decisions on what and how to operate were made at the lowest levels without any coordination or without regard to any policy. Generally speaking decisions were made in the context of what was best for that individual leader or person in charge. In many cases decisions on what Department of Border Enforcement would do were made by tribal leaders, criminal elements, or other influential individuals that were external to DBE.
4. Lack of any professional training or certification program. It appeared that there had been no effort for a considerable number of years to develop any capacity to train, equip, and organize the DBE.
   
   

These findings prompted me to look for solutions based upon international standards and work with the Iraqi government in an open and cultural sensitive method to assist the transformation of the Department of Border Enforcement into an effective department that could meet the challenges of present day Iraq.

Doug Melvin is the President of DACC Associates, a security and management firm headquartered in Boise, Idaho.